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1 Introduction 
1.1 Assigner 
The thesis was assigned by Landis+Gyr, Finland. Landis+Gyr is a multinational 
organization that designs and manufactures smart meters and develops the system 
software for them. Landis+Gyr is a globally recognized leader in the field of energy 
management and has operations in over 30 countries and in five different continents 
and is headquartered at Zug, Switzerland. (About Landis+Gyr 2020.) In Finland the 
R&D center is located in the city of Jyväskylä and employs roughly 250 professionals 
working on smart reading systems and smart metering solutions.  
1.2 Smart Meters and Smart Grid 
Most of the customers of Landis+Gyr for smart meters are energy companies. Smart 
meters send the meter values to energy companies remotely while “dumb” meters 
need to have their values read manually. In addition to the basic use case, smart 
meters have a great amount of functionality. Smart meters often come with displays, 
features such as prepayment and for example energy companies can remotely cut 
energy distribution through the meters. Smart meters provide benefits for both the 
energy companies and households. Because smart meters provide real-time data of 
the energy usage, energy consumption can be tracked more efficiently, which is good 
both environmentally and socially wise. (Smart meters explained 2020.) 
Electric grid delivers electricity from the power plant to its intended targets such as 
households or businesses. The actual grid consists of transmission lines, substations 
and transformers. Smart grids differ from the traditional grids by making two-way 
communication possible between the utility and the intended customers. Smart grids 
allow sensing and control along the transmission lines, and the different forms of 
automation, computers, controls and equipment working together make the grid 
smart. (What is the Smart Grid? n.d.) 
  
1.3 Objective 
The evolving world of remote connections and IoT brings plenty of opportunities; 
however, also risks. Smart metering solutions provide functionalities that could 
possibly be used for malicious activity against energy companies, energy distribution 
and consumers; hence, the cyber risks should be mitigated. Concerns related to 
cyber security threats in smart energy management have been on the increase all 
over the world (Cybersecurity of critical energy infrastructure 2019, 1).  
The assigner of this research had a need for a practical patch management solution 
to simplify the process of applying and testing third-party patches. The purpose of 
this work is to develop a patch management process for Solution Integration Testing 
(SIT) team to further support patching and testing in a large corporation environment 
while bringing more security to the field of energy management. The idea of this 
research is to assure the continuity of stable, secure software and services while 
increasing the security standards. Preventing possible security threats from 
escalating due to vulnerabilities in third-party components is the ultimate goal. 
Efficiently patching and testing the applications will benefit the customers of 
Landis+Gyr; therefore, this work will bring more security to the field of energy 
management. 
The research starts by identifying and clarifying the theory about vulnerabilities and 
what kind of threats the applications might encounter. Understanding how the 
vulnerabilities are reported and how the severities are assessed is a part of the 
chapter as well. Two real life cyber-attacks related to the topic are demonstrated as 
well.  
The theory about patches and updates is clarified by explaining what they are and 
why it is difficult to constantly keep software and applications up to date, along with 
the reasons why it is important to do so. The definition of patch management is 
demonstrated as well. 
  
The last part of the theory is about the Landis+Gyr AIM product and its third-party 
components which this work focuses on. The components are demonstrated on a 
relatively high level. 
The actual implementation begins by introducing the testing environment and 
product versions used in this research. A database security assessment tool is 
introduced, and its requirements along with the execution phases and results are 
described. It is followed by the evaluation of the patch management process which 
consists of information about the Oracle patches, requirements placed by the 
assigner and theory about the process steps. The last part of the implementation is 
the practical implementation of the process steps based on the theory composed in 
patch management process evaluation.  
2 Research frame 
The problem to be researched is the lack of a clear process to applying and testing 
software patches in end-to-end testing stage. Some amount of security testing is 
being carried out by other teams before the product is pushed to end-to-end testing 
stage. Solution Integration Testing team is responsible for the final verification and 
testing before the product is released to the customer; thus patch and security 
testing is important. 
2.1 Research Questions 
This thesis discovers what kind of difficulties individuals and organizations face when 
patching software and applications and discusses what kind of threats and risks the 
lack of patching poses. The theory for the patch management is researched using 
different publications by reliable authors. The research results combined with the 
Landis+Gyr’s requirements and procedures are used to answer the main research 
questions which are: 
  
1. What kind of patching process to implement? 
 
The theory for the patching process itself is not enough, and the objective of this 
thesis was to create a practical process supported by the theory, which was gathered 
by answering the first research question. The practical part is dependent on the 
limitations and requirements placed by the assigner. The main question is followed 
by a sub question: 
1.1. How to implement a patch management process? 
 
Having a theory backed up by different authors and implementing the process based 
on the theory is a solid foundation. However, making sure everything works after the 
patching is crucial. The research questions are answered starting from chapter 4.3 
and the last question supporting the main question is: 
1.2. How to ensure everything works after patching? 
 
2.2 Research Methods 
Qualitative research methods are used to answer the research questions in this 
thesis. According to Kananen (2019, 26), the criterion for qualitative research is met 
because the research takes place at the work site, and the idea is to get a better 
overall view and understanding of the subject. Constructive approach is used to 
gather information for an existing problem and by creating a new construction of 
already researched solutions, the existing problem can be solved (Lukka 2001). 
2.3 Reliability 
The theory of this thesis is based on best practices related to patch management, 
vulnerabilities and organizational literature 
  
published by professional, official, respected or otherwise trustworthy authors. Differ
ent types of utilized publications include but 
are not limited to blog posts, documents, websites and articles.  
The methods used in this thesis are chosen based on how well they fit the 
organizational environment, how common they are, how relevant they are and will 
be in the future. Many of the methods are also modified in order to make them work 
better in the organization. 
3 Theory 
3.1 Software Vulnerabilities 
3.1.1 Definition 
A vulnerability has several different contexts in computing; however, it is often 
associated with holes or weaknesses in applications and operating systems. They 
compromise the overall security and are often the result of design flaws or bugs. 
Vulnerabilities may be used by attackers to cause harm to the stakeholders of the 
application. The stakeholders of an application include but are not limited to the 
application owner, users and other entities that rely on the application. 
(Vulnerabilities 2020.) 
3.1.2 OWASP 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a non-profit foundation for 
improvisation of secure software. OWASP powers community-led open source 
projects, over 275 local chapters worldwide, tens of thousands of members and 
industry-leading educational and training conferences. Publications by OWASP are 
free to use and the foundation operates solely on donations. OWASP was established 
on 1 December 2001. (About the OWASP Foundation 2020.) 
  
3.1.3 OWASP Top Ten 
The OWASP Top 10 is a document for developers about the most common critical 
security risks to web applications. By mitigating the risks associated in the document, 
companies and developers are on a path to minimizing security risks in their web 
applications. The Top 10 risks are presented below: (OWASP Top Ten 2020.) 
1. Injection – Injections flaws such as SQL, NoSQL, OS and LDAP injections occur 
when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as a part of a command or 
query. This may result into the interpreter executing unintended commands 
or even accessing data without proper authorization. 
 
2. Broken Authentication – Incorrectly implemented authentication and session 
management functions in applications allow attackers to compromise 
passwords, keys, session tokens and/or to exploit other implementation flaws 
to hijack users’ identities. 
 
3. Sensitive Data Exposure – Some web applications and APIs do not properly 
protect sensitive data, meaning attackers may steal or modify weakly 
protected data to do credit card frauds, identity thefts or other similar crimes. 
 
4. XML External Entities – Poorly configured XML processor could parse a 
reference to an external entity leading to loss of confidential data, denial of 
service, server-side request forgery, port scanning and/or other system 
impacts. 
 
5. Broken Access Control – Access control is used to control what users are 
allowed to do. Often this is not enforced properly, and it can be exploited by 
hackers to access unauthorized functionality. User accounts and sensitive files 
including the rights to modify data and access rights are compromised.  
 
6. Security Misconfiguration – Insecure default configurations, wrong ad hoc 
configurations, open cloud storage, misconfigured HTTP headers and error 
messages with sensitive information. This is a very common issue which can 
be avoided with proper configuration.  
 
7. Cross-Site Scripting – XSS allows script execution in browser which may lead 
to attacker hijacking user sessions, defacing websites or redirecting to 
malicious websites. Applications sending untrusted data without proper 
validation are prone to this. 
 
8. Insecure Deserialization – Commonly leads to remote code execution. Will 
lead to attacks such at replay attacks, injection attacks and privilege attacks. 
 
  
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities – Any components with 
sufficient privileges and exposed vulnerabilities may lead to an attack on the 
system resulting in a possible server takeover or data loss. 
 
10. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring – Lack of logging or monitoring will allow 
attackers to effectively tamper the system without any attention. 
 
The OWASP Top Ten is mostly beneficial towards people developing web 
applications; however, CVE and CVSS explained in chapters 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 often 
contain vulnerability information of the most common security threats in web 
applications, which are explained in this chapter. Therefore, having at least a high-
level understanding of the actual vulnerabilities is beneficial, especially when 
working with patches and assessing CVSS ratings. 
3.1.4 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a list of standardized names for 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and other security related exposures. The CVE standard 
provides a unique identifier for vulnerabilities and exposures and a description of the 
incident. It is a dictionary type list rather than a database. CVE was launched in 1999 
with the aim to standardize the names for all known vulnerabilities and exposures 
while making data sharing across different databases and tools easier. Before a 
common standard was implemented most of the cybersecurity tools had their own 
databases along their own naming standards making it difficult to determine 
whether another database already referred to a same vulnerability. CVE is now 
accepted as the industry standard for vulnerability and exposure identifiers. Each 
CVE entry has the following structure and Figure 1 illustrates what a standard CVE 
entry looks like: (About CVE 2019.) 
• CVE ID number (i.e. CVE-2017-1044) 
• Description of the vulnerability or exposure 
• References 
 
  
 
Figure 1. CVE entry CVE-2020-7222 
3.1.5 Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) provides the characteristics of a 
vulnerability and produces a numerical score to reflect its severity. The score can be 
used to translate the severity to a more readable representation such as low, 
medium, high and critical, which helps organizations to assess vulnerabilities and 
prioritize them in their vulnerability management process. CVSS is a standard used by 
organizations worldwide, and the CVSS Special Interest Group (SIG) is on a mission to 
improve it. SIG consists of representatives from a broad range of industry sectors 
from banking and finance to technology and academia. (Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System SIG 2020.) Below, in Table 1, is an example of a CVSS table of a 
  
MySQL Server database vulnerability reported with the CVE-2013-0375 identifier. 
(Common Vulnerability Scoring System version 3.1: Specification Document 2020.) 
Table 1. CVSS v3.1 table of CVE-2013-0375 vulnerability 
 
3.2 Significant Cyber Attacks 
The following incidents are included in this thesis to demonstrate how critical it is to 
keep applications and software up to date. Both of these attacks were conducted on 
outdated operating systems and software, and the attacks could have possibly been 
avoided by having the latest versions and patches, along with proper policies to 
upkeep the security and patch management. A single weakness in an application may 
result in a chain of events. 
3.2.1 Ukraine 2015 Power Grid Cyber Attack 
The first known power outage caused by a cyberattack occurred on 23 December 
2015 in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast in Ukraine. Three power companies were affected by 
this, Prykarpattyaoblenergo, Chernivtsioblenergo and Kyivoblenergo. These power 
companies disclosed the incident to be a cyberattack, and other power companies in 
Ukraine were affected with similar problems as well. These other companies 
  
however do not admit to being hacked. The consumers of Prykarpattyaoblenergo 
energy company were affected most severely. Roughly 30 substations were turned 
off and 230 000 people were left without power for 1 to 6 hours. (Vijay, Hoikka & 
Blomqvist n.d, 2.) 
It is believed that this attack was conducted by Russian advanced persistent threat 
group called “Sandworm” and the event occurred during an ongoing military and 
geopolitical conflict between Ukraine and Russia. The group has recently targeted 
European Union institutions, American government entities, NATO targets and they 
have tried to hack European telecommunication companies repeatedly. The group is 
known to use a hacking tool called BlackEnergy. (ibid., 2.) 
Blackenergy is a Trojan malware application designed to perform actions on the host 
computer. The installer will attempt to bypass user account controls and it will 
prompt for administrative access if it is not able to bypass them. It exploits a 
Windows 7 backwards compatibility feature, and the malware solely targets Window 
operating systems. With the correct privileges it loads plugins over the network 
which can execute arbitrary tasks on the host computer. (ibid., 3) 
Using the malware, the attackers were able to harvest user credentials and 
passwords stored on the employee workstations. The attackers harvested credentials 
for virtual private networks used by the employees to access the SCADA control 
system. As the final step before the actual attack, the attackers installed KillDisk 
malware on the servers and workstations thus rendering them inoperable. Killdisk 
malware often overwrite critical system files and in some cases, it overwrites log files 
such as system logs. (ibid., 4)  
Right before initiating the attacks on the substations, the attackers installed custom 
firmware on the gateway devices to ensure that remote commands cannot be issued 
to the substations. The switches at the substations had to be manually flipped in 
order to turn the power back on. The attackers could have done much more damage 
  
to the substations; hence, the attack was deemed to be a message of some sort to 
Ukraine. (Vijay, Hoikka & Blomqvist n.d, 5-7.)  
ESET, a Slovakian security firm reported that the systems running on Windows XP 
were widespread, not all workstations had antivirus software, many systems and 
software had not been patched, and critical systems were accessible remotely and 
poorly defended. (ibid., 8.) 
3.2.2 WannaCry Ransomware Attack 
WannaCry is a crypto ransomware used to extort money. Crypto ransomware works 
by encrypting files making them unreadable or simply locking the user out of the 
computer. It does so until the request, a ransom, is paid. Computers running 
Windows OS were targeted by WannaCry and it demanded the cryptocurrency 
Bitcoin as the ransom. (What Is WannaCry ransomware? 2020.) 
The attacks took place all over the world in May 2017. Wannacry spread through 
computers running an outdated version of Windows. The incident could have been 
avoided by having the latest patches released by Microsoft. WannaCry took 
advantage of a weakness in the Windows operating system, and the hack was 
allegedly developed by the United States National Security Agency. A security patch 
mitigating the vulnerability was released roughly two months prior to the attacks by 
Microsoft. Individuals and organizations that had not updated their systems were left 
vulnerable. (ibid.) 
It is advised not to pay the ransom as there is no guarantee the stolen data will be 
returned, and future attacks are more likely. In this case, the attackers did not have a 
way to associate the payment with the victim’s computer rendering the payments 
useless. A great amount of data was lost; however, according to F-Secure some 
amount of data was restored. (ibid.)  
  
WannaCry affected around 230 000 computers globally. Companies such as 
Telefónica, a Spanish mobile company and thousands of NHS hospitals and surgeries 
all across the UK were affected by this attack. One third of the NHS hospitals were 
affected, which caused devastating results. Ambulances were rerouted leaving 
people without help, and £92 million was lost after 19 000 appointments were 
canceled due to the attack. WannaCry spread beyond Europe and crippled computer 
systems in over 150 countries. It is estimated that WannaCry caused a total of $4 
billion in losses all over the world. (What Is WannaCry ransomware? 2020.)  
3.3 Software Patches and Updates 
3.3.1 Definition 
A software patch is generally a chunk of code used to fix, change or update 
something in the software. Supported programs commonly have their patches 
released by the original vendor while open-source programs might have several 
third-party developers releasing them. Single patches often are a temporary solution 
between version releases. (Rouse n.d.) Patches are not to be confused with updates 
or upgrades as patches are commonly used to address single issues whereas updates 
often contain several patches and enhancements, and upgrades often introduce new 
versions and features. This definition; however, is not an industry standard; 
nevertheless, it is often acknowledged by the industry. Yantz (2019) states that there 
are several different types of patches:  
• Hotfix – Used to fix a specific issue and unlike normal patches, these are 
developed and released as soon as possible. Some hotfixes can be applied 
while the application or system is still running without having to restart or 
close the program. 
 
• Point release – Minor update intended to fix an error or flaw in a piece of 
software without adding any features. 
 
• Maintenance Release – Known as incremental update between service packs 
or versions to fix multiple issues. 
 
  
• Security Patches – Security patch is a change in an asset in order to correct a 
weakness caused by a vulnerability. The purpose of a security patch is to 
prevent exploitation and mitigate threats to an asset. 
 
• Service Pack or Feature Pack – These are major patches and they are a 
collection of updates, fixes and feature enhancements. They are delivered in 
a single package and often fix many issues. They often include all the previous 
patches, hotfixes, maintenance and security patches released before the 
service pack. 
 
• Unofficial patches – Third parties and user communities often create these 
patches. Often, It is the result of lack of support from the original developer 
or the product has reached the end of its life. These patches like the standard 
patches are designed to address same kinds of issues. Unofficial patches can 
be malicious. 
 
• Monkey Patches – Used to extend or modify a plugin or software locally 
without altering the source code. 
 
It must be noted that not all vendors, developers or users have the same naming 
scheme or release protocol, and the list above is only an example of some common 
ones. Vendors might have their own naming scheme, e.g. Oracle names its security 
patch bundles as Critical Patch Updates and single or a small number of security 
patches as Security Alerts (The Critical Patch Update Program 2020). 
3.3.2 Challenges in Patching 
Hackers are constantly coming up with new techniques to break software and exploit 
flaws in order to penetrate security measures. Updating software might seem like a 
nuisance because when security measures are taken care of, the users do not have a 
sense of the lurking security threats. According to Boblin (2018), the four most 
common reasons people delay their updates are: 
• Compatibility issues – A major reason for why people don’t regularly update 
their computer software is due to compatibility issues. People who use 
specialized software might run into issues with their applications and It is a 
valid concern for people who need to use their applications without any 
hinders. 
 
  
• Lack of knowledge – People might not be aware of why updating is important. 
This is especially common amongst non tech-savvy people. People might 
think that updates are a way to make them purchase something. 
 
• Bad experiences – Updates might occasionally break something causing 
unpleasant experiences. 
 
• Being comfortable – Everything works and anything affecting the 
environment is seen as a nuisance. People may think that updates bring 
unnecessary complications. 
 
There are many reasons for not applying updates. The above examples cover only a 
fraction of the actual reasons. Being aware of the risk associated with running old 
versions is crucial. Timed and silent updates are utilized by some companies to force 
patches for the most critical vulnerabilities. Apple is known for deploying silent 
updates to mitigate security risks (Bohn 2019). 
Patching is a challenge and many companies have a hard time keeping up with them. 
According to Stauffer (2017), the most common reasons why companies are not 
prioritizing patching higher are the following:  
• Too many patches to keep up with 
• Patching is manual and time consuming 
• Lack of resources 
• Applications cannot be patched internally 
• End user resistance 
• Risk of creating more problems 
 
All these reasons are valid complaints; however, the threats caused by vulnerabilities 
should weigh more in all instances. Companies often use third-party components in 
their own products meaning that they are dependent on the vendor to release the 
patches for any exposed vulnerabilities. This places stress on the companies to apply 
and test the released patches even more because they have to follow the vendors’ 
release schedule. Some patches are released unexpectedly as well. The whole 
  
process and making sure that everything works after applying the patches requires a 
tremendous amount of resources. 
3.3.3 Importance of Patching 
Till this day software patching and the lack of it remain as one of the biggest security 
threats an organization has to deal with. Applications and software running on older 
versions are easy targets for hackers who want to cause harm to a company. 
Patching however is a matter of prioritization. (Cihodariu 2019.) Companies should 
prioritize patching so vulnerabilities in their own assets are mitigated thus providing 
safety to their customers as well. Having a solid process to patch management is a 
step to increase the security standards in a company and to optimize resources. The 
following statistics are based on different surveys done by several different 
companies and the results are gathered in a single article written by Cihodariu (2019) 
for Heimdal Security. 
• 80% of companies that had a data breach or failed audit could have 
prevented by patching on time – Voke Media survey (2016) 
 
• Types of malware and ransomware that could have been avoided: WannaCry, 
NotPetya, SamSam 
 
• 20% of all vulnerabilities caused by unpatched software are classified as High 
Risk or Critical – Edgescan Stats Report (2018) 
 
• Microsoft reports that most of its customer are breached via vulnerabilities 
that had patches released years ago – Microsoft’s Security Intelligence Report 
(2015) 
 
Vendors discover and disclose vulnerabilities in their software and then release 
patches to address these problems. The disclosure of the present vulnerabilities is 
exposed to adversaries as well. Unfortunately, it might take time for organizations to 
patch the software instead of doing it as soon as possible. Adversaries are able to 
analyze and determine how to exploit the weaknesses and the organizations that are 
yet to patch are vulnerable to the exposed vulnerabilities. ”Patching quickly is 
  
essential, as the likelihood of publicly available exploits increases significantly after 
patches are released.” (Security Vulnerabilities and Patches Explained 2015, 1.) 
3.4 Patch Management 
Patch management process is a solution to protect enterprises and their products. It 
is about mitigating the risks related to loss of confidential data and maintaining the 
integrity of the systems. Patch management, when done properly, can be the most 
efficient way to mitigate security vulnerabilities and even the most cost-efficient way 
to do so. (Ruppert 2007, 5.) 
It is very unlikely that an application is developed in a way that it does not require 
corrections, upgrades or modifications in its lifecycle, which is this the reason why a 
process for patch management is important and required to fix the issues regularly. It 
is a process that needs to be done routinely in order to be the most effective. One 
compromised system can lead to other systems being compromised as well. 
However, it does not mean that a company should treat all of its systems equally but 
to prioritize its most critical assets instead. Patches should eventually be applied to 
every system and application though, and not just to the ones most valuable to the 
company. Multiple security controls, in which patch management is a part of, are an 
effective way to maintain good enterprise security. Patch management should not be 
treated as the only solution to avoid security vulnerabilities though. (ibid., 5-7.) 
Requirements for a patch management process vary. Variables such as organization 
size, budget, supported systems, number of employees and systems, location of 
systems and the number of third-party vendors all influence the process. (ibid., 8.) 
3.5 Landis+Gyr AIM 
Landis+Gyr’s Gridstream smart metering solution is used to simplify the way energy 
companies collect and handle their metering data. Smart meters, versatile 
communication options, advanced software and comprehensive services are 
  
included in the solution. AIM is the smart metering system that provides data 
management capabilities, task flow engine and validation beyond basic HES 
functions. AIM is capable of efficient multi-energy metering and with a single 
integrated smart metering software, the utility can manage its AMM infrastructure, 
enhance business processes and support the network management operations. 
(Landis+Gyr AIM 2020.) 
Support for utility processes: (Landis+Gyr AIM 2020.) 
• Business Processes – Billing, balance settlement, customer service, contract 
management and new business development 
 
• Network Management – Network monitoring, load management and network 
investment planning 
 
• Smart Metering Operations – Automated data collection and management, 
device asset management and troubleshooting 
 
AIM is based on modularity and openness and designed for the ever-changing energy 
market. Its purpose is to help energy companies collect and manage their metering 
data efficiently, process it in a flexible manner and transfer the information between 
different parties effortlessly. AIM offers a single source for metering data that can be 
then transferred to other systems. The architecture of AIM has a high level of 
openness and interoperability across multi-utility infrastructures, and it enables bi-
directional communication with hardware and software platforms developed by 
other manufacturers. It means that AIM is flexible enough to be integrated with 
other systems. AIM also offers a fair range of value-adding applications such as 
deployment and reporting. As of today, Landis+Gyr AIM is running in over 2 million 
metering points in EMEA region thus proving its reliability and scalability in smart 
metering operations. (ibid.) 
Landis+Gyr AIM uses three main components developed by third-party vendors: 
Java, Oracle Database and Oracle WebLogic. Oracle Database and WebLogic are the 
main components covered by the patch management process. AIM uses Oracle DB 
  
Enterprise edition and Java SE 8; however, migration to OpenJDK is underway.  This is 
because Oracle has changed its licensing terms, and patches are not free of charge 
after January 2019 for commercial use. Free to use Java version with a long-term 
support for security fixes is required and OpenJDK provides this. 
3.5.1 Java 
Java is both an object-oriented, class-based programming language and a platform 
developed by Sun Microsystems in 1995 and later acquired by Oracle. Java is widely 
used in many applications and different domains such as: (Johari 2020.) 
• Banking – Used for transaction management 
• Retail – Billing applications written in Java 
• Information Technology – Used to solve implementation dependencies 
• Android – Java or Java API is used to write Android applications 
• Financial services – Used for server-side applications 
• Stock market – Algorithms written in Java 
 
The list above does not cover all the use cases of Java because it is really widespread 
and used in over three billion devices. (Johari 2020.) The different Java platforms are: 
(Java vs Java EE 2020.) 
• Java Standard Edition (SE) – Provides basic functionality and is mostly used to 
develop APIs for desktop applications. 
 
• Java Enterprise Edition (EE) – Is built on top of SE and provides APIs for 
running large scale applications. EE is mainly used for web applications.  
 
• Java Micro Edition (ME) – Provides a flexible environment for applications 
running on embedded and mobile devices (Java Platform, Micro Edition (Java 
ME)). 
 
 
Java Virtual Machine 
JVM is a virtual machine that enables the computer to run a Java program. When a 
  
Java program is executed, Java compiler first compiles the Java code into bytecode. 
JVM then translates the bytecode into native machine code which the CPU can read. 
JVM also optimizes the program memory. Java is platform independent meaning that 
the code is actually written for JVM instead of the physical machine, which is what 
ultimately enables Java to run on all platforms. Figure 2 illustrates the program 
execution phases. (Java JDK, JRE and JVM n.d.) 
 
Figure 2. Java program execution 
 
Java Runtime Environment  
JRE is a software package that provides Java class libraries and JVM along with other 
components to run the Java applications. JRE is used when Java applications need to 
be executed instead of being developed. (ibid.) 
Java Development Kit 
JDK is a software development kit used to develop Java applications. JDK is bundled 
with JRE and several development utilities such as compilers, JavaDoc, Java Debugger 
and more. The relationship between all the components can be seen in Figure 3. 
(Java JDK, JRE and JVM n.d.) 
  
 
Figure 3. Relationship between JDK, JRE and JVM 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3.5, OpenJDK is a free to use and open source version of the 
JDK for the Java SE. The project is sponsored and led by Oracle and it is licensed 
under the General Public License (GNU GPL) version 2 with a linking exception. It 
means that without linking exception, the components linked to Java class library 
would be subjected to the terms of the GPL license. (Rouse 2019.) 
3.5.2 Oracle Database 
Oracle Database is a Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) which 
manages relational data. Oracle Database allows quick and safe storing and 
retrieving of data. Oracle Database has several features: (What Is Oracle Database 
2020.) 
• It can run on various hardware and operating systems such as Windows 
Server, Unix and different distributions of Linux making it cross-platform. 
 
• Applications running on different platforms can communicate with Oracle 
Database. For example, applications running on Windows can connect to 
  
Oracle Database running on Linux. 
 
• Oracle Database is ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) 
compliant meaning that it helps to maintain data integrity and reliability. 
 
• It is one of the first databases to support GNU/Linux before it became a 
commerce product. 
 
Oracle Database is a powerful database with several structural features that make it 
popular. There are three main editions of the Oracle Database: (What Is Oracle 
Database 2020.) 
1. Enterprise Edition (EE) is the most commonly used edition. It has no limits on 
maximum number of CPUs, memory or database size. EE includes features 
that are not available in other editions.  
 
2. Standard Edition (SE) is the same as EE but with limited features. The only 
differences are that It is limited to four or lower CPUs and doesn’t come with 
as many features as EE. 
 
3. Expression Edition (XE) is free and is available on Windows and GNU/Linux 
platforms. It is limited to 2 CPUs, has the maximum of 2GB of RAM and 12GB 
of user data. XE’s features compared to EE and SE are very limited. 
 
In addition to EE, SE and XE, there are other editions in addition to as well; however, 
these are the main editions. The naming schemes, editions and features slightly 
differ in different Oracle DB releases. 
3.5.3 Oracle WebLogic Server 
WebLogic is a scalable, enterprise-ready Java EE application server. WebLogic 
supports deployment of many types of distributed applications and is ideal for 
building applications based on Service Oriented Architecture. SOA methodology is 
aimed at maximizing the reuse of application services. WebLogic provides a standard 
set of APIs to create distributed Java applications that can access a wide range of 
services such as messaging services, databases and connections to external systems. 
  
End-users access applications using a web browser client or Java clients. WebLogic 
allows enterprises to deploy applications in a secure, highly available and scalable 
environment. Figure 4 illustrates the main Oracle Fusion Middleware stack. (Fusion 
Middleware Understanding Oracle WebLogic Server 12.1.3 2020.) 
 
Figure 4. Overview of Oracle Fusion Middleware 
4 Implementation 
4.1 Test Environment 
Patching and testing are conducted in a separate security testing environment 
running on Landis+Gyr network. It is a virtual Windows Server 2016 running locally; 
therefore, it is not accessible from the outside the network. The server is powered by 
  
2.39GHz virtual processor and has 24GB of RAM. The IT department of Landis+Gyr 
can change the virtual server specification if needed. The environment will have the 
latest and most stable version of Landis+Gyr AIM. Oracle product versions are:  
• WebLogic 12c (12.1.3) 
• Database 12c (12.2) 
 
The latest versions are used because there are many variations of environments with 
different combinations of product versions. Including them all in this thesis requires a 
remarkable amount of resources, and the purpose of this thesis is to provide a basis 
for the patch management, which can be utilized in the future for all the 
environments and versions. An environment with the latest versions also works as a 
simulation of the customer environments. 
4.2 Database Security Assessment Tool 
Oracle provides a lightweight stand-alone Database Security Assessment Tool  
(DBSAT) to assess regulatory compliance process by collecting relevant types of 
configuration information from the database and evaluating the security state to 
provide recommendations on how to mitigate the identified risks. DBSAT can be used 
to complement the patching process. For instance, it can be used as a regression test 
method to check the status of the DB before patching and re-checking after the 
patching. DBSAT is free for Oracle customers and enables customers to find: (Oracle 
Database Security Assessment Tool 2020.) 
• Security configuration issues and the remediation methods 
• Users and their entitlements 
• Location, type and quantity of sensitive data 
 
With DBSAT it is possible to: (Security Assessment Tool User Guide 2019.) 
  
• Quickly and easily assess the current security status and identify sensitive 
data within the Oracle DB. 
• Reduce risk exposure using Oracle Database Security best practices, CIS 
benchmark recommendations and STIG rules. 
• Leverage security findings to accelerate compliance with GDPR. 
• Improve the overall security of Oracle Databases and promote security best 
practices. 
 
DBSAT consists of three components: (Security Assessment Tool User Guide 2019.) 
Collector – Executes SQL queries and runs OS commands to collect data from the 
system to be assessed. The data is written into a JSON file which is used by the 
Reporter in the analysis phase. 
Reporter – Analyzes the data collected by the Collector. It generates a Database 
Security Assessment Report in HTML, Excel, JSON and Text formats. 
Discoverer – Functions like the Collector but collects data based on specified 
settings. The collected data is used to generate a Database Sensitive Data 
Assessment Report in HTML and CSV formats. The relationships between the DB, 
DBSAT and output are demonstrated in Figure 5. (Security Assessment Tool User 
Guide 2019.) 
  
 
Figure 5. DBSAT Components, Sources and Reports 
 
4.2.1 Prerequisites 
DBSAT version 2.2.0 supports Oracle DB 10.2.0.5 and later releases and has several 
other prerequisites: (Security Assessment Tool User Guide 2019.) 
Supported Operating Systems: 
• Solaris x64 and Solaris SPARC64 
• Linux x86-64 
• Windows x64 
• HP-UX IA (64-bit) 
• IBM AIX (64-bit) & Linux on zSeries (64-bit) 
 
DBSAT uses Zip and Unzip to compress or decompress the generated files. By 
default, these are included in the Oracle DB installations, however, the Unzip utility is 
not included in the Oracle DB 12.2 and higher. 
  
Collector must be running on the same server that contains the database in order to 
collect complete data. It also needs to be run with an OS user with read permissions 
on files and directories under ORACLE_HOME in order to collect and process file 
systems data using OS commands. Correct DB user privileges are required as well. 
Reporter requires Python 2.6 or later to run. 
Discoverer requires JRE 1.8 or later to run. It collects metadata from DB dictionary 
views and matches them against the patterns specified to discover sensitive data; 
therefore, sufficient DB user privileges are required as well. 
4.2.2 Performing the Assessment 
The DBSAT had not been utilized by SIT before and was deemed to be useful when it 
was discovered; therefore, it was chosen to be a part of this thesis. Utilizing the 
DBSAT is a great way to increase the security measures with a small amount of effort 
and without additional costs. DBSAT version 2.2.0 supports the operating systems 
used by SIT and the tool can be used on Oracle DB versions 10.2.0.5 and later. The 
assessment was performed on the test environment introduced in chapter 4.1. 
The initial setup was straight forward. The files are downloaded from Oracle site and 
moved to the server running a database. If the prerequisites are met, there are no 
extra steps to be taken. The tool should be extracted in a directory named “dbsat” 
and in this case the directory was created in the Oracle folder which contains other 
Oracle appliances as well. The next step was to make sure that the ORACLE_HOME 
environment variable path pointed to the Oracle DB directory. The final step was to 
check whether the Zip and Unzip paths were correct in the DBSAT bat file and the 
program was ready to execute. The execution begins by running the Collector which 
is demonstrated in Figure 6. 
  
 
Figure 6. DBSAT Collector phase 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 6, the Collector first asks for the correct username (User), 
password (PW) and DB. Then it connects to the DB, gathers the data and exports it as 
a password protected zip file which contains a JSON file. The zip file was generated 
with the same name as the DB. The error in the figure was acceptable because no 
information from the OS was needed. The next step was to run the Reporter and the 
steps are demonstrated in Figure 7. 
  
 
Figure 7. DBSAT Reporter phase 
 
The Reporter requires the zip filename as a parameter which was generated by the 
Collector and then it asks for the password which was entered in the Collector phase. 
The reporter generated three types of reports: A HTML file, An Excel sheet and a text 
document. The reports provide a lot of information about the DB and an example of 
a HTML report is demonstrated in Figure 8. 
  
 
Figure 8. DBSAT HTML Report 
 
As seen in Figure 8, the report contains a plethora of information about the DB 
security level. The report provides different sections with the number of total 
findings and evaluations of the risk levels in the findings. In Figure 9, an example of a 
“High Risk” finding in “Basic Information” is demonstrated. 
  
 
Figure 9. DBSAT HTML Report risk finding 
 
As seen in Figure 9, the DBSAT tool discovered a High-Risk vulnerability which in this 
case was unpatched software. It provides the remediation method and the patch ID 
which should be applied. The DBSAT provides lots of information that can be used to 
complement the patch management process without being too heavy on the 
resources. The Discoverer was not used in this case because an overall view of the DB 
using default configuration was enough. It however enables more customized testing 
in the future if it is deemed necessary. 
4.3 Evaluating the Patch Management Process 
4.3.1 Oracle Patches 
Oracle releases Critical Patch Updates which are a collection of security fixes for 
Oracle products. They are available for the customers who have a valid support 
contract with Oracle. CPUs are released on Tuesdays closest to the 17 of January, 
April, July and October. An announcement of the release is published on Thursdays 
preceding the CPU release date. (Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins 
2020.) CPUs are cumulative, meaning each update contains security fixes from 
previous updates and each one has an update advisory describing what kind of 
  
security fixes have been added in the update. All the security vulnerability fixes can 
be tracked back by reviewing the prior CPU advisories. For example, the January 
2020 CPU advisory mentions that there are 334 new security patches across a range 
of different Oracle products. The affected products and versions are mentioned 
along with a patch availability document for each one. The advisory also provides a 
Risk Matrix Content table which lists all the newly addressed vulnerabilities as 
illustrated in Table 2. (Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory – January 2020, 2020.) 
Table 2. Oracle DB CVSS 3.0 Table 
 
There are risk matrices for each product affected by the CPU. Each vulnerability is 
identified with a CVE and the matrix uses Common Vulnerability Scoring System to 
provide information about the severity of the vulnerabilities. The Base Score is 
between 0.0 and 10.0, where 10.0 represents the most severe vulnerability. It also 
provides values for metrics that indicate the preconditions required to exploit the 
vulnerability. This helps to identify the systems that are at most risk so they can be 
  
patched first. Oracle adopted the latest CVSS version 3.0 in 2016. (Use of Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) by Oracle 2020.) 
Oracle states that it periodically receives reports of attempts to maliciously exploit 
vulnerabilities for products that they have already released security patches for. In 
some instances, some attacks have been successful due to the failure of applying 
Oracle patches. Therefore, it is highly recommended that the product versions that 
are used are actively supported and the CPUs are applied without delays. Until 
applying the patch, it may possible to reduce the risk of an attack by blocking 
network protocols required by an attack. The same applies for attacks requiring 
certain privileges or access to certain packages, removing privileges or the ability to 
access packages from users not in need of privileges may reduce the risk of a 
successful attack. These approaches; however, may break the application 
functionality so testing in non-production environments is recommended. Oracle 
states that this workaround approach should not be used as a long-term solution 
because it does not correct the underlying problem. If for some reason a CPU has 
been skipped, Oracle recommends reviewing the prior CPU advisories in order to 
make sure the products are patched in case of vulnerabilities. (Oracle Critical Patch 
Update Advisory – January 2020, 2020.) 
Oracle issues Security Alerts for vulnerability fixes that are deemed too critical to be 
included in the next CPU distribution. (Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and 
Bulletins 2020.) These Security Alerts are based on CVE entries and the fix is intended 
to directly address the vulnerability. Like in a CPU Advisory, the Security Alert 
Advisory lists the affected products and versions along with the patch availability 
document. Risk Matrix Content table is included as well. 
Oracle has an e-mail subscription to receive notifications of CPU’s and Security 
Alerts. (Oracle Security Alert Advisory – CVE-2019-2729, 2020.) It is a necessary step 
in order to be up to date of the new updates. 
  
4.3.2 Requirements 
The process should be developed in a way to be quick enough to allow the customers 
of Landis+Gyr to safely patch the applications, preferably before they even find out 
about patches or vulnerabilities in the third-party applications. Before any changes, 
modifications or patches are applied to the environment, checkpoints need to be 
performed. This is a safety measure to ensure a rollback option if the environment or 
products are rendered unstable due to the changes. The test environment is a single-
server environment, so a checkpoint of the sole server is enough. In a multi-server 
environment, a checkpoint of all the servers is necessary and all the servers need to 
be rolled back in order to avoid anomalies. Patch testing should be as swift as 
possible with a clear process to follow. It is carried out using automation and manual 
verification is used for the steps that require it. The patching process itself should be 
implemented without the need of any third-party applications.  
4.3.3 Planning the Process 
The patch management lifecycle and process will be implemented based on the steps 
created by Yantz from IT Support Guys. It is a company based in the US with several 
big-name customers such as Microsoft, Dell, Amazon and Google. IT Support Guys 
provide solutions for Cloud Services, Desktop Support, VoIP Services, Backup and 
Recovery, Networking and Security. According to Yantz (2019), the process consists 
of 10 steps. It must be noted that these are general steps in order to create the 
process and a single default template will not work for every organization as is; 
however, the steps will provide a basis for the patching framework in which the 
process will be consisted with. 
Discovery – Keeping an inventory of the assets involved in the process is a good 
practice. All devices, hardware, systems, operating systems and their versions, third-
party software and applications should be listed. When organizations grow, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to keep up with the systems and programs; thus, an 
up-to-date inventory is valuable. Every SIT server environment has a Wiki page of its 
own. The page provides a broad range of information of the environment and the 
  
same template is used for all environments. It can be used as the location to store 
and maintain the inventory list. Inventory is not an essential step of this process in 
this study because the focus is only on two applications. However, this process is 
developed with future usability in mind; hence, a list of the assets can prove to be 
beneficial. 
Prioritization – Assessing the risk level and priority of systems and applications 
makes it easier to direct the resources appropriately. It is necessary to know what 
assets are at most risk. The vulnerabilities in Oracle applications are assessed by the 
vendor itself. As mentioned in chapter 4.3.1, all the reported vulnerabilities have a 
CVSS rating to assess how severe they are. This reduces the workload of patching 
applications by a huge margin; however, it forces to trust the vendor on the severity 
ratings. Evaluating the vulnerability severities is a topic of its own and because the 
focus of this work is on the patching process; the evaluations carried out by Oracle 
are sufficient and decisions can be made based on the CVSS score. Australian Cyber 
Security Centre ACSC states that security vulnerabilities with varying severity should 
be patched in the following timeframe: (Assessing Security Vulnerabilities and 
Applying Patches 2020.) 
• Extreme risk – Within 48 hours of the patch release 
• High risk – Within two weeks 
• Moderate or low risk – Within one month 
 
ACSC also suggests that patch deployment is prioritized when resources are 
constrained. Temporary workarounds are possible as well, and Oracle has its own 
guideline for this. However, it is not recommended if a patch is available. 
Prioritization requires manual verification from a user, and it should begin by 
reviewing the Risk Matrices in Oracle CPU advisories or Security Alerts. Preparation is 
to be carried out by reviewing the CPU Pre-Release Announcement to check whether 
any WebLogic or Oracle DB versions used are affected. Alternatively, the 
Recommended Patch Advisor by Oracle can be used to list all the recommended 
  
patches; however, this can only be done after the patch is released and does not 
provide information about the severities. 
Policies – There should be policies regarding which systems and applications should 
be patched and what conditions and requirements are to be followed. The purpose 
of a patching policy is to set rules and provide a framework for vulnerability 
identification, threat assessment, priority ranking and remediation. Responsible 
personnel or a team should be composed in order to create and maintain a patch 
management process. They are either responsible for the monitoring of patch 
releases and security alerts and/or applying the patches. They are responsible for 
identifying the affected applications and versions in patch notes and assessing the 
severity ratings of the vulnerabilities. Prioritizing the patching timeline is to be done 
by them as well by following the conditions in “Prioritization”. (Example of CVSS 
based Patching Policy n.d.) They should test the environment stability in case of 
errors or conflicts after the patches have been applied. 
Monitoring – There are multiple ways to do this. It can be done manually, using 
programs to automatically check for updates or simply having an e-mail subscription 
to receive notifications of updates. As mentioned in chapter 4.3.1, Oracle releases 
CPUs quarterly; therefore, the approximate date of releases is known a year in 
advance, which allows planning in advance. However, Oracle may release Security 
Alerts or other unexpected updates in the case of severe threats to its customers. 
They inform the customers by e-mail notifications so the personnel responsible of 
patch management should subscribe to the e-mailing list. Alternatively, the Oracle 
“Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts and Bulletins” page can be monitored. An RSS 
feed is also an option. Oracle publishes the following information in its CPU Pre-
Release Announcements: 
• Name and version numbers of the products affected by vulnerabilities 
• Number of security fixes for each product suite 
• CVSS score for each product suite 
• Additional information 
 
  
Oracle also states that the Pre-Release Announcement content may change, and the 
content is official when the CPU Advisory is released. (The Critical Patch Update 
Program 2020.) 
Testing – Having a test environment solely for patch testing is recommended. It 
allows monitoring in case the changes break something in the environment or 
applications without causing any critical disturbances. The testing environment 
should be stable before applying any patches. SIT team uses environment monitoring 
software which will alert for any problems in the environment. Test automation is 
used to check whether the environment & AIM and HES applications are functional. 
A third-party tool is used to deploy the test automation and the results are reported 
in a web page. 
Configuration Management – In case of any problems, having documentation of the 
intended changes and results allows quick identification of unintended changes. The 
results should be documented after the testing phase. Landis+Gyr has an internal 
Wiki page for Oracle DB and WebLogic patches which is used to report in which 
AIM/HES release the patch has been tested, the patch number and what 
environment was used. 
Roll out – After the patch has been validated and the test environment is stable 
without any errors or conflicts, other environments running the same AIM/HES 
versions can be patched. Precautionary measures need to be taken as well when 
patching other environments. 
Auditing – Auditing is carried out to monitor the environments for any errors or 
incompatibility issues that might occur after patching. After successful patching the 
environment should be continuously monitored for any unexpected problems. 
Zabbix is used as the monitoring tool, and SIT has a rotating list of personnel who 
monitor the environments. Therefore, this step does not require additional work 
because it is already being done.  
  
Reporting – Informing the stakeholders and persons relevant to the applications and 
systems is important. This will ensure everyone understands how important patch 
management is. The purpose of this process is to quickly assess whether a patch can 
be safely applied to an environment running the latest versions of AIM/HES products. 
The results should be shared especially with the stakeholders working in the 
customer interface. 
Reviewing, Optimizing and Repeating – Rinse and repeat the lifecycle of the patch 
management process. It is a never-ending cycle as long as the applications get new 
patches. Alterations to the process should be done, e.g. new applications added to 
the process if necessary.  
4.4 Practical Implementation of the Process 
4.4.1 Policies and Requirements 
These are the general policies which should be followed in order to upkeep a patch 
management process. The policies are consisted based on the theory from the 
chapter 4.3.3. It is up to the team manager to assign the responsible team or 
personnel to handle the process tasks and how they are enforced and implemented 
to the team’s routine. As this process is consisted primarily for the Oracle WebLogic 
and DB products, further expansion and development of the process requires more 
rules and policies which can be consisted using the theory from chapter 4.3.3. 
However, the rules consisted for this process are sufficient for the current needs. 
Alterations need to be made if Oracle changes its release schedule or makes a similar 
change. A simplified structure of the policies is visualized in Figure 10. 
• Team or personnel should be assigned for patch management 
 
o Personnel responsible for patching should subscribe to the Oracle E-
Mailing list. Alternatively, the “Critical Patch Updates, Security Alerts 
and Bulletins” page can be routinely viewed for any updates. 
 
  
• Update schedule should be prepared yearly 
 
o Preparation for the quarterly CPU releases should be planned in 
advance. Create a study ticket of the upcoming CPU Pre-Release 
announcements and reserve the resources. 
 
o In case of Security Alerts or similar review the alert as soon as possible 
and take the necessary actions to start the patching process. 
 
• Restore points should be created 
 
• Patch files should be downloaded to the corresponding location 
 
• Optionally an inventory list of the systems, applications and versions can be 
composed 
 
 
Figure 10. Visualization of the Patch Management Policies 
 
4.4.2 Pre-Patching and Monitoring 
A major requirement for the process was swiftness and staying ahead of the 
customers is preferable. In order to do this, any patch announcements released by 
Oracle should be reviewed by a responsible team member as soon as possible. 
Preparation for the patching should begin by following the steps composed in this 
chapter. By following the steps, it is possible to stay ahead of the customers or at 
  
least be informed of any vulnerabilities in a timely manner. Even if the patch is not 
tested before the customers reach out asking, it is good to acknowledge the situation 
and be aware of the severity of the vulnerabilities. Being able to respond to the 
customer query with the prioritization and schedule of the patching is better than 
informing them that the patch is not yet being tested. A simplified and clear 
flowchart of the process steps is visualized in Figure 11. 
1. Refer to the Oracle CPU Pre-Release announcement when it is announced to 
check for any affected applications and versions. If the CPU is already 
released this step is obsolete. 
 
2. Assess the severity ratings of the vulnerabilities by inspecting the Risk 
Matrices in the CPU Adversary 
 
a) If a Security Alert or similar is released, assess its Risk Matrices 
 
3. Create a ticket for application patching with the relevant urgency. For 
example: 
 
1) 7.5 – 10.0 = Extreme risk 
2) 5.0 – 7.5 = High risk 
3) Less than above = Moderate or low risk 
 
 
Figure 11. Flowchart of Pre-Patching & Monitoring 
 
4.4.3 Patching and Testing 
The actual patching and testing are conducted in this phase. The steps are consisted 
using SIT’s prior procedures while following the theory from chapter 4.3.3 and 
  
combining the theory with the requirements placed for this process. Ensuring a 
rollback option in case the environment is rendered unusable due to patching and 
the environment stability is verified using automation tools and manual methods. 
The least number of new procedures is introduced in this phase because patching 
itself is not a new thing in SIT. This new phase description however does provide a 
clear and simple guideline on how the patches should be applied, as required. The 
steps are visualized as a flowchart in Figure 12. 
1. Download the patch files and move them to the correct product and 
version folder located in the online file storage. If the files are already 
downloaded this step is obsolete. 
 
2. Copy the patch files from the online file storage to the environment 
 
3. Check environment monitoring tool for any environment problems 
 
a. If any problems occur attempt to resolve them before continuing 
 
b. In case of any unfixable problems: take a note of the them and if 
they are not deemed critical or won’t prevent patching continue 
with the process 
 
c. If patching is not possible due to a major problem, consider testing 
using another environment or consult what can be done about the 
problem. Prioritize the problem mitigation based on the relevant 
CVSS vulnerability ratings in the patch notes. 
 
4. Run test automation and review the results 
 
5. Create a checkpoint of the environment 
 
6. Follow the Oracle guideline on how to apply the patch 
 
7. After applying the patch with the OPatch utility it should give feedback 
whether the patching was successful or not 
 
a. Repeat steps 3. and 4. if patching was successful 
  
 
Figure 12. Flowchart of Patching & Testing 
 
4.4.4 Post-Patching and Reporting 
This is the final phase of the patching process. Like in the prior phases, this step also 
utilized old methods along with new ones. If the patching process was successful and 
went as intended, the customers and relevant stakeholders can be informed with the 
results. It is up to the team how it is done and what kind of information is provided. A 
process should constantly evolve and reviewing it is necessary, in case any changes 
or alterations are needed. This whole process is a framework which can be shown to 
customers to demonstrate what kind of measures are taken in order to test the 
patches. The process was constructed strictly following the given requirements and 
no third-party tools are necessary. A visualization of the final steps can be seen in 
Figure 13. 
1. Update the internal Oracle DB & WebLogic patch Wiki page 
  
1) Which environment was used to test the patch 
2) Product versions 
3) Patch ID 
 
  
2. Inform the stakeholders and relevant people with the results. Especially 
the personnel working in the customer interface should be informed. 
 
3. The process should be reviewed for any necessary alterations 
 
 
Figure 13. Flowchart of Post-Patching & Reporting 
5 Discussion & Conclusions 
The objective of this thesis was to create a patch management process using best 
practices, methods and guidelines composed by the industry professionals and 
organizations and which can be used for different applications, versions and software 
now and in the future. In this thesis the practical implementation of the patch 
management process was composed for Oracle products because SIT has many 
different variations of environments and Oracle product versions, which makes it 
difficult to keep up with all of them. The idea was to enhance the security standards 
in the energy sector through patch management. 
The theory for the process steps was established by mixing both the best practices, 
methods and guidelines with SIT’s own procedures. It also required prior knowledge 
and headwork from the author of this thesis. With the author having hands on 
experience working in the SIT team, it was easier to plan on how to implement new 
patch management procedures in the team. As a result, the new process 
complements the prior way of applying the patches, which can be seen as a good 
thing because the process consists of familiar procedures. This work utilized the best 
practices from the prior patching procedures and mixed them with new ones to 
  
create a process which is proven to be working along with new enhancements. The 
basis of the process is implemented in a way which makes it is possible to be altered. 
Patch management is a broad field with many variations and variables, and thus 
creating the perfect process with everything covered is nearly impossible or really 
difficult. Different applications have different vendors with their own patch 
management policies and having to follow them all is difficult. This work however 
fulfilled the requirements put in place but it is only the basis for an ongoing project 
which patch management is. This work successfully provided the necessary baseline 
to initialize proper patch management starting with the Oracle products. 
There are many options available for handling the burden of patching and some of 
them cost money. A requirement for this thesis was that the process should be done 
without causing any additional costs. For example, the ten process steps introduced 
in chapter 4.3.3 were the basis of the process and composed by Yantz from IT 
Support Guys. Even though Yantz provided the steps for free and they can be utilized 
to create a patch management process, the idea was to sell a service. Evaluating the 
sources which can be used to create the process steps was difficult and required a lot 
of criticality to avoid misleading information. Forming the process manually made it 
possible to make sure that everything works within the organization while 
complementing its ways of handling tasks. 
The environment monitoring tools, and test automation have their own role in 
making sure that the environment is stable after patching. They provide an overall 
view of the environment and whether the AIM/HES applications or parts of them are 
working or not. As a new addition the DBSAT tool introduced in chapter 4.2 proved 
to be useful in addition to the patch management process. For example, in chapter 
4.2.2 the DBSAT reported a “High-Risk” vulnerability which in that case was an 
outdated patch. Monitoring tools and test automation provide the basic information 
of the environment while the DBSAT tool provides specific information of the 
databases. The results can be analyzed for a better understanding of the security 
level of the databases and whether any actions need to be taken in some sectors. It is 
  
possibly beneficial for the customers of Landis+Gyr as well because it checks for 
problems in a way that has not been done before. 
As mentioned, patch management is an ongoing process which needs to be 
constantly maintained in order to stay relevant and up to date. There; however, are 
many options that can be used to improve the methods. For example, Ansible is a 
free and open-source tool that can be used to automate Oracle patches, and there 
are guides on how to do it, using custom scripts to ease the use of Opatch and 
SQLPlus, the tools used to apply the patches. Oracle even has its own 
“Recommended Patch Advisor” which was mentioned in “Prioritization” part of 
chapter 4.3.3 but what really sets this manually created process apart from the 
premade solutions is that the severities are evaluated manually. This helps to 
prioritize how, when and what should be patched and in what timeframe. On the 
organizational level processes should be followed, and this thesis provides the basis 
for it. There are several parts of the process that can be done differently and even 
automatically; yet, including everything in this thesis is virtually impossible, and the 
goal was not to offer a solution which covers every aspect of patching but provides a 
solid foundation for further development. 
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